PUBLICUSS
By Robert Seibert
Hummus; Hamas; HmmmÉ MmmmÉ.?
How sharp the sword of democracy. Four times in the past few months, Middle Eastern voters, at
the insistence and encouragement of the United States, have returned
disappointing results.
In elections widely regarded as ÒsufficientlyÓ clean and
fair, the voters in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine have handed U.S.
interests stunning setbacks.
In Iran, in an election widely expected to return moderate
political leader Hafshemi Rafsanjani to the presidency, a virtual unknown and
decidedly more conservative nationalist, Mahmoud Amadinezad, was elected. He promptly reasserted IranÕs intent to
continue down the road of nuclear development and attempted, with less success,
to undo the steps toward social and economic moderation achieved by his
predecessor.
In Iraq, under direct U.S. supervision and security, the
Iranian electorate empowered a ShiÕa slate with a clear ÒsympathyÓ for Iran, an
election that may return Prime Minister Jafaari, the head of the Dawa Party, to
the most key post in IraqÕs new government. Sectarian violence is likely not far behind.
In Lebanon, an election following the ÒvoluntaryÓ withdrawal
of Syrian forces failed to consolidate the power of the anti-Syrian
factions. And, in a clear rebuke
to American interests, the hard-line Hizbullah list, long described as a
terrorist organization by the U.S. and Israel, won a substantial bloc of seats
in the new legislature. Hizbullah
won a measure of legitimacy and influence that ensures its presence in the
legal government of Lebanon.
Finally, in an election that Israel and the U.S. assumed
would provide a mantle of legitimacy to Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah party,
Hamas confounded the pundits and won the election outright. As we go to press, a new Palestinian
government, organized by the political wing of Hamas, is taking over the
ÒgovernmentÓ of Gaza and the
West Bank.
There are more than a few inconsistencies, of course. At least 10% of the new Palestinian
legislators are languishing in Israeli prisons, from where they conducted their
campaigns. And a large percentage
of the remaining Palestinian legislators have done serious time in jail, most
under the conditions of Òadministrative detention,Ó uncharged and untried for
months and years on end.
There is persistant public speculation that Israel and the
U.S. will try to undermine this new government, at the least by withholding financial support, or by
supporting the opposition, as in Iran and Iraq, or by overt military
intervention.
This may or may not be true, and the U.S. denies it. But heavyweight columnists like the New
York TimesÕ Thomas Friedman credit it enough to editorialize against it. Any failure of Palestinian
self-governance, he argues, should be clearly a consequence of Palestinian
actions, not decisions in Tel Aviv or Washington. The unintended consequences of such a failure would be
unimaginable.
But of course, the thought of nationalist Iranians, Iraqi Dawas, Lebanese Hizbullites and
Palestinian Hamasists prevailing in free elections is pretty unthinkable
anyway, right? They are, at least
in the popular opinions of Israel, the U.S. and the rest of the west, terrorist
organizations, right?
Who on earth would vote for a terrorist to represent
them? Why would they?
The answer, of course, is that all of these parties and
organizations are much more than simple terrorists. They are all organizations that present multiple identities
and realities to their constituents.
Context means a lot.
It is a clichŽ, but it contains more than a grain of
truth: One manÕs terrorist is
another manÕs freedom fighter.
There are more to these organizations than we are generally aware.
They are, in the view of their supporters, much more than
simple terrorists. They are more
likely perceived as the political resistance, fighting against oppression or
foreign control of their lands.
Yes, they commit violent acts, but acts of resistance or reprisal, not
acts of fundamental purposeless violence.
This is a point of view not often voiced in our country, particularly
after 9/11.
But it is a point of view taken for granted in many
countries around the world. Those
countries are nearly opaque to our gaze.
Their histories and traditions are largely closed to us. We will not, cannot see.
Take for example, Hamas. There are things about Hamas that we simply do not see. For example, we do not see or
understand the social work of this organization. The schools, hospitals and orphanages that they support are
not on our radar. But these
institutions are highly visible to the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank,
who rely on them to educate their children, bind their wounds, and provide for
public order.
The dominant image of Hamas in Palestine is the social
worker, not the warrior. Our
failure to recognize this reality blinds us to the base of support that carried
Hamas to victory in those recent elections. Whatever shortcoming Hamas may have, and they may be legion,
nobody, but nobody accuses them of corruption. Nobody believes they are in it for the money. The same is not true of the P.A. or
Fatah.
There is a history invisible to us. While the PLO was in exile in Lebanon
(first) and then in Tunisia (later), Hamas was creating facts on the ground in
Palestine. When the Oslo accords
brought the PLO back to Palestine as the Palestinian Authority, it created an immediate conflict between Hamas
and the PLO. The PLO received the
guns and money. Hamas continued
its practical work, both in relief and resistance.
There has always been tension between these two
organizations. I had the privilege to travel in Israel and Palestine in 1991,
fairly early in the Intifadah and during a period of time in which the U.S.
attempted to bring both Israel and the Palestinians to the bargaining table. Our delegation was able to meet with
both PLO and Hamas representatives.
Before you rush to call the approriate authorities and turn
me in for treason, let me asssure you that we were only a few days behind SecÕy
of State James Baker who met with the same representatives. And in the same places. It was all above board, you see. The idea, simplicity in itself, was
that if you could get the Israelis and the Palestinians to sit down and talk
together, you could make peace between them. A noble idea.
And they did eventually sit down near each other, if not exactly
together, in Madrid. They didnÕt
make peace, however.
Our meetings took place in a Gaza villa named the Marna
House. We were to meet first with
representatives of the PLO for an hour or so. And then we were to meet with representatives of Hamas, for
a similar meeting. The first
meeting went off as scheduled.
The PLO representatives were well-presented, courteous and
well-spoken. They were
steadfast in their demands for the return of their lands and rights. They made their pitch, we asked our
questions, and then we waited for the Hamas representatives to arrive.
We waited for hoursÉthree of them to be exact, and still no
Hamas representatives appeared.
After three hours, the PLO deputation left. Immediately, the Hamas delegation appeared. They refused, they made it clear, to
share any platform with the despised, corrupt, secular and incompetent PLO.
Their presentation to our group was impressive for its
passion and commiment. They clearly combined the elements of resistance,
political reform and religion in a single body. Their contempt for Fatah and
the PLO was complete. It seemed clear to us that these two groups were not
destined to cooperate in any meaningful way. And to this day, they have not.
Analysts of the election are insistent in their contention
that the voters endorsed Hamas as a way to reject what they saw as the
corruption and incompetence of Fatah.
They did not vote for Hamas as a religious party and they do not expect
Hamas to attempt to establish a theocracy in Gaza and the West Bank.
In other words, the voters expect Hamas to transform itself
into responsible, honest government.
Put in another way, the voters expect Hamas to become
Hummus, the political equivalent of that succulent Arab dish, a delicious
confection of garbanzo beans, garlic and other delights, welcomed and enjoyed
around the globe.
Can this be done?
Can Hamas become HummusÉHmmm?
It has been done before. Terrorist/resistance/freedomfighting organizations have transformed
themselves over time into respectable governments. A couple of examples canÕt hurt: the United States; Israel.
Israel? Yes,
Israel. Only 60 years ago Zionist
organizations like the Stern Gang and Irgun were widely condemned as
terrorists. Great Britain had a reward out for the arrest and imprisonment of
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir right up until their elections as prime
minister. So yes, even terrorists
can be rehabilitated.
No one should understand that better than Israel and the U.S. WeÕve been there ourselves.
ItÕs a time for constructive engagement, not obstruction and
subterfuge. Hamas may let us down,
but there is an equally realistic case that they may rise to the occasion. There are already indications that they
are ready to abandon their call for the destruction of Israel. There is evidence that they are willing
to try to shut down the suicide bombings and rocket attacks.
It will be hard to do in the face of continued assassination
of their leaders and the impoverishment of their government.
It is time for statesmanship, leadership, on both sides of
the conflict.
WouldnÕt that taste great?