The
Language of Politics
By
Richard W. Crockett
In
urging us to extend President Bush a chance to succeed with the Òsurge,Ó
Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, remarked that General Petrais may be
the ÒGeneral Grant of the surge.Ó
Implicit in this reference to General Grant is a comparison of the Iraqi
civil war to the American Civil War of one hundred and fifty years ago. However, following this line of
thought, one will discover that the comparison fails to be convincing. While it is an interesting observation
coming from Graham, a son of the South, I think Petrais is more representative
in this historical analogy of Òthe Robert E. Lee of the surge.Ó The parallel shows both Petrais and Lee
to be brilliant commanders, but trying to accomplish a losing, hopeless, and
unwise cause.
It is true that in both cases of civil
war the side firing the first shots enjoyed some initial success. In the early
stages of the American Civil War, the South enjoyed initial success, perhaps up
to the battle of Gettysburg. The
Americans enjoyed success in Iraq up to the Òmission accomplishedÓ banner on
the aircraft carrier, Lincoln.
Eventually, other factors took over. In both cases, the initial successes did
not hold up.
In the American Civil War, superiority of
numbers of men and material turned the tide, even with inferior military
leadership, although General Grant was clearly competent. In the Iraq civil war, the dogged
determination of competing, religious zealots to consolidate power is likely to
prevail. In Iraq, we are an
invading Òliberator,Ó and our actions have led to a civil war between Shiites
and Sunnis at a minimum. What we have liberated are the Shiite and Sunni sects
who want to push their own brand of sectarianism and guarantee its survival through
the exercise of political power.
As Iraq has descended into this civil war, the Americans are becoming
increasingly irrelevant. We refuse
to employ the numbers of men and material needed to establish anything
approximating ÒsuccessÓ by whatever definition we employ.
The surge is more of the same. Twenty thousand troops is not a full
mobilization. Rather it is a continuation of a doctrine of lighter, fewer and
faster in the manner of Don Rumsfeld, which worked fine for ousting Saddam
Hussein, but failed miserably in occupying Iraq. In this instance it may be
lighter, fewer and slower, because the ÒsurgeÓ has not manifested itself as
yet—too little, too late. Moreover, we have no business mobilizing at the
level needed to assure any particular outcome of someone elseÕs civil war,
albeit a war of our making.
A
more apt comparison to our civil war would require an intervention in our civil
war by a major European power, seeking to referee the outcome. It is true that Briton continued trade
with the South, and showed a southern tilt, but at no point did they attempt to
referee between the North and the South at the point of a bayonet or gun. Imagine if they had. Would it have been welcomed in the
North to have them interfere with LincolnÕs effort at preserving the Union, or
would the South have wanted interference from the outside with their goal of
establishing a viable Confederacy?
Not likely in either case. Nor would we have welcomed in the North a well-meaning
attempt to partition this country along any other lines dividing the country
between slave and free states, or cultural nationalism, or any other
conceivable explanation for our civil war, as some have suggested for Iraq, by
dividing the country into semi-autonomous regions of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds.
What
the language of politics reveals in our discussion of this war is that we are
limited by our experience, and the main problem is that the American experience
is not one that can be easily replicated in the Middle East. To argue for any
version of ÒsuccessÓ in the civil war in Iraq, and to do so from an American
perspective is to delude our selves.
To refer to American historical legends, Lee or Grant or any other
figure from the American experience, in an attempt to understand Iraq, interferes
with our capacity to recognize what is possible, because it is an American
filter with American qualities, which does not work with an Iraqi lens. Our
mistake in entering this war occurred when we willfully ignored the peculiar
attributes of the culture of the place we sought to transform. We can do ÒgoodÓ in this world, but the
Òmission of AmericaÓ has its limits.
2/15/07