Changing the Course
By
Richard
W. Crockett
Much
of the discussion over the war in Iraq is focused upon Òchanging the course,Ó
which for some of us means getting out of Iraq altogether. For others it means revision of our
ÒstrategyÓ into a course of action that will allow us to leave Iraq
ÒrespectablyÓ or even Òsuccessfully,Ó or as I wrote the other day with Òsaving
face.Ó But the discussion framed
in this way loads the debate in favor of a protracted stay in Iraq. It fails to acknowledge a distinction in
usage between strategy and tactics. Usually
the term ÒstrategyÓ is reserved for longer term planning whereas the term
ÒtacticsÓ is reserved for the means of getting there.
If
one is interested in seeing a shorter-term solution to the war in Iraq, the
debate will have to be less about strategy and more about tactics, and it
doesnÕt really need a public discussion.
The military is better able to figure out the tactical means of exit,
once they are given the order.
Understanding this will allow us to focus upon the policy choice without
predetermining an outcome in favor of the protracted spilling of American
blood. Further, it will make clear
the futility of engaging in discussions over Òstrategy,Ó when those should have
occurred in relation to previously well-defined goals, which we neglected to
create prior to the invasion of Iraq, nor make clear, beyond knocking over
Saddam HusseinÕs regime. The lack
of planning for a protracted conflict and for the need for Ònation buildingÓ
which followed our invasion makes it impossible successfully to place an ad
hoc patch on our lack of clear goals,
or upon any strategy, which will repair the failed outcome of the war. Colin Powell foresaw the risk to
this mistaken policy in the planning stages, although as a Ògood soldier,Ó he
later became complicit in it. Many
Americans foresaw the potential for failure, also, and now a clear majority of
Americans more clearly understand it.
We
now are living with the consequences of our inept preparation and with the attendant
folly of trying to do war planning after the fact. We need to get out in a manner consistent with the way we
went in, and consistent with our initial goals—regime change. We got rid of Saddam Hussein, now let
us be done with it.
The
solution to the Iraq problem for the Bush Administration and their desire to
save face, is not in the denial of the existence of a civil war in Iraq. True, denying that it is a civil war is
a way of denying an American foreign policy failure. However, the solution lies in acknowledgement that this
conflict is a civil war,
and that as such it is a matter that the Iraqis must settle themselves. It is often said that the Iraqis Òmust
stand up as we stand down.Ó The
Iraqis are standing up as they understand it—they are fighting and dying
every day. They just do not have a
common vision for Iraq, nor do they share a common vision with us.
If
the war in Iraq is recognized as a civil war, then we cannot
ÒloseÓ it. How can we ÒloseÓ
another nationÕs civil war? To put
the best face upon it, we have removed a ruthless dictator; we have assisted in
the development of democratic institutions, and it is now theirs to
decide. If in making that decision
the Iraqis should determine to reject those institutions, then they have done
what is sometimes called self-determination of peoples.